Content-based publish/subscribe systems offer an interaction scheme that is appropriate for a variety of large scale dynamic applications. However, widespread use of these systems is hindered by a lack of suitable security services. In this paper we present scalable solutions for confidentiality, integrity, and authentication for these systems. We also provide usage-based accounting services, which are required for e-commerce and e-business applications that use publish/subscribe systems. Our solutions are applicable in a setting where publishers and subscribers may not trust the publish/subscribe infrastructure.
INTRODUCTION
The Publish/Subscribe (pub/sub) interaction scheme provides a loose coupling between event generators (the publishers) and event consumers (the subscribers), which makes it ideally suited for a variety of dynamic applications such as software updates, location-based services for wireless networks, supply chain management, multiplayer online games, traffic control, and stock quote dissemination. Publishers and subscribers are loosely coupled by a network of brokers that route events from the publishers to the subscribers. Different ways of expressing subscriber interest in events have led to different pub/sub schemes [12] . Topic-based systems specify interest on certain topics or subjects, type-based systems specify interests in event-types where all event-types are organized in an inheritance hierarchy, and content-based systems specify interest via filters (using a subscription language) over the contents of the event. Content-based sysPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. tems are considered to be the most general and we focus on these systems in this paper.
One of the major hurdles to wide-scale deployment of Content-Based Pub/Sub systems (CBPS) is security. In particular, ensuring confidentiality, integrity and authentication of events as they traverse through the pub/ sub infrastructure 1 . A closely related problem is that of accounting, which allows publishers to bill subscribers based on usage; e.g., for applications such as stock quote dissemination. In this paper we provide solutions to these problems in CBPS systems with a very relaxed trust assumption, namely, one where the publishers and subscribers may not trust the broker network. We describe events in XML documents and use the secure XML document dissemination techniques of Bertino and Ferrari [7] combined with the proxy re-encryption scheme of Jakobsson [16] to provide confidentiality and accounting. We use digital signatures [5] to provide integrity and authentication. Our solution does not require any security associations (e.g., shared keys) between publishers and subscribers, and we informally argue that our solution scales to a large numbers of publishers and subscribers connected via an Internet-scale pub/sub infrastructure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our approach, Section 3 presents our solution, Section 4 discusses scalability, Section 5 discusses related work, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
APPROACH
In this section we define a general model for CBPS systems, discuss our adversarial model, and outline our approach for providing confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and accounting. Figure 1 illustrates a model used by CBPS systems (e.g., Gryphon [2, 4] , Siena [9, 10] ). The model comprises publishers that advertise and publish events, subscribers that register interest in events and receive them, and brokers that maintain subscriptions and route events using matching algorithms and routing tables. Border brokers are connected to publishers and subscribers and register them with the pub/sub infrastructure. 
A Model for CBPS

Adversarial Model
In this work we consider malicious adversaries who have access to the network traffic of the CBPS system and can observe, insert, and modify events and subscriptions. In other words, we consider adversaries who will attempt to: (1) violate confidentiality of events by observing them (e.g., in order to re-sell the contents for personal profit), and (2) violate integrity and authentication by inserting/ modifying fake events and subscriptions (e.g., in order to tarnish the reputation of a publisher, mislead subscribers with false information, cause accounting errors). Our adversarial model is stronger than that assumed by most other work in this area [18, 17] since we allow the adversary access to traffic within the broker network in addition to traffic outside the network (by outside traffic we mean traffic between publishers and the broker network, and between subscribers and the broker network).
Confidentiality and Accounting
Our solution for confidentiality assumes that the adversary has access to broker network communications. This implies that events should be routed in a manner that does not disclose the contents to the broker network. However, matching and routing based on encrypted content is challenging. Wang et al. [22] suggest using techniques of performing computations on encrypted data [1] but these techniques would be difficult to implement in practice and would require significant modifications to existing matching and routing algorithms such as those described in [2, 10] . Instead, we provide a solution based on the observation that only selected parts of an event's contents typically need to be confidential and, furthermore, matching and routing can be accomplished without these parts. We encode events in XML documents and then use the secure XML document distribution techniques 2 of Bertino and Ferrari [7] to selectively encrypt parts of an event's contents and distribute the corresponding key only to authorized subscribers.
In Figure 2 we illustrate three examples of maintaining event confidentiality by encrypting only selected parts of the event contents. In the first example, a stock quote dissemination service encrypts the price of the stock with a 
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Figure 2: Examples of Confidential Events
symmetric key k and allows the pub/sub infrastructure to route the event using other fields such as the stock symbol, opening price, and volume. The key k is then encrypted with the publisher's public-key P K to form the complete encrypted package. In the second example a game-score service encrypts the score in a similar manner. In the third example an online real-estate service that wishes to disclose property location to only authorized real-estate agents who have paid their dues encrypts the address of the property while allowing matching and routing on all other fields. This approach will not allow matching and routing on encrypted event contents, which can limited applicability in certain cases. For example, a subscriber cannot search based on the price increase of a particular stock. Nonetheless, one can easily build more complex examples that allow a reasonably rich specification of event interests. For example, one could combine multiple stocks in a particular category (e.g., technology stocks) and allow routing based on average percentage price change while keeping the individual prices encrypted. In the real-estate example, the county and state of the property can be disclosed to allow searching for houses in a particular geographic area that fall within a certain price range. A formal categorization of events for which confidentiality can be provided using this approach needs to be undertaken.
After encrypting event contents, the challenge now lies in distributing the symmetric key k to authorized subscribers. For this we establish a Proxy Security and Accounting Service (PSAS) that is connected to border brokers as illustrated in Figure 3 . Based on broker requests, PSAS transforms packages encrypted with publishers' public keys into packages encrypted with subscribers' public keys using the proxy re-encryption scheme of [16] . Subscribers then de-crypt k with their private keys and obtain event contents by further decrypting with k. This provides confidentiality of events while they are routed through the pub/sub infrastructure without the need for any direct security association between publishers and subscribers. PSAS is an additional component in the pub/sub infrastructure and in keeping with our adversarial model we allow the adversary access to communications between PSAS and other infrastructure components.
We use PSAS to also provide accurate and verifiable usagebased accounting, which it is able do by keeping logs of event-package transformations.
Integrity and Authentication
We use XML digital signatures [5] to provide integrity and authentication for events and for transformation requests. Event integrity and authentication is required to assure subscribers that the event contents being paid for have not been modified and have come from the right source. (Here we assume that subscribers can verify publisher signatures). However, since selective parts of event contents are encrypted, the questions arises as to whether the signature should be applied on cleartext contents or encrypted contents. On one hand, signing only the encrypted contents is considered insecure [3, 11] . On the other hand, if only the cleartext contents are signed then intermediate infrastructure components (e.g., PSAS) will not be able to verify the signature because they only have access to encrypted events. Therefore, we use two signatures: one applied over the cleartext for the authorized subscribers (which can be encrypted as recommended in [5] ), and the other applied over the encrypted package and then included in the package.
To prevent adversaries from submitting transformation requests for unauthorized subscribers, PSAS must be able to verify integrity and authentication of these requests. This is provided with digital signatures and for verifying the signatures PSAS is given verification keys at initialization (or when a new border broker is setup).
PROTOCOL AND ANALYSIS
Definitions
• Symmetric key operations. c = Es(m) is the symmetric encryption (e.g., AES) of a message m using key s where c is the resulting ciphertext. The corresponding decryption is denoted by m = Ds(c).
• El Gamal. An El Gamal [14] encryption for a decryption/encryption (dec/enc) key pair (Ki, P Ki) is represented as EncP K i (m). The resulting ciphertext is (a, b) = (mP Ki r mod p, g r mod p) with g, p and q being group parameters and r chosen at random from Zq. Dec is the standard El Gamal decryption algorithm and requires dividing mP Ki r by (g r ) K i .
• Digital Signatures. A RSA signature using a signing key Ki is represented as Sig K i (m). This signature can be verified by using the corresponding public verification key P Ki. We use a bar over these keys to distinguish signature/verification (sig/ver) keys from dec/enc keys.
• XML Document. We use the definition of [7] where an XML document is a tuple • • EncP K j (s) is the El Gamal encryption of key s with encryption key P Kj;
) is a RSA signature on the encrypted document and key using signing key K l .
The Protocol
We now describe our protocol with the protocol interactions and details illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. communication with the servers and do not manage any keys on their own.) The servers then generate a RSA sig/ver key pair (Kps, P Kps) with the signing key Kps shared in a (t, n) threshold manner (e.g., by using the distributed algorithm of Boneh and Franklin [8] or a trusted dealer). PSAS uses a distributed signature generation method (e.g., the method of [23] ) to sign messages with this key. The corresponding public verification key is distributed to all CBPS entities. All border brokers then register their signature verification keys with PSAS (P K b1 and P K b2 in this case).
• Publisher Registration. Publishers register with a border broker by sending a signed request, which is authenticated by the broker. The broker co-signs the request and then forwards the request to PSAS, which generates an El Gamal key pair for the publisher with the decryption key shared among the PSAS servers in a (t, n) threshold manner 3 (e.g., using techniques of Pederson [19] or Shamir [20] ) with proactive, periodic share refreshing (e.g., using techniques of Herzberg et al. [15] ). PSAS then signs the publisher's encryption key and sends it back to the broker who then forwards it to the publisher. Each server in PSAS also stores the publisher's verification key. In Figure 3 the publisher's sig/ver key pair is denoted by (K pb , P K pb ) and the dec/enc key pair by (K pb , P K pb ).
• Subscriber Registration. Subscribers also register with a border broker by sending a signed request that comprises an El Gamal encryption key and a set of event interests. This encryption key is generated by the subscriber (as opposed to PSAS for publishers) and, in fact, PSAS is not involved in management of subscriber keys.
• Event generation and distribution. When the publisher P B wishes to publish an event (with sensitive contents encrypted) encoded in an XML document d e s , it generates a package pac = (Sig
EncP K pb (s)). P B then gives the package to broker B1 who authenticates it using P B's signature and starts routing the package. All intermediate brokers route the package using matching and routing algorithms that are executed on the cleartext part of the event contents using existing algorithms (e.g., [2, 10] ). The brokers can verify the signature on the package to ensure its integrity and authenticity.
• Event transformation and delivery. When the package reaches a border broker that has a subscriber with matching interests (in this case broker B2 with subscriber SB), it co-signs and forwards the package to PSAS along with the subscriber's encryption key for transformation; i.e., to convert the package such that it is encrypted with SB's public key. A coordinator, c, picks up the request and applies the transformation of [16] on the encrypted document key, EncP K pb (s), with the help of PSAS servers. If we let (a1, b1) = EncP K pb (s) then the transformation requires the computation of (a2, b2) = EncP K sb (s). This is achieved by each server i in PSAS performing the following computation:
1. Server i verifies the broker's signature on the request and the publisher's signature on the package. 2. Server i selects a random value ri from Zq, and computes (a2 i , b2 i ) = (b
where K pb i is server i's share of the publisher's decryption key. This pair is sent to the coordinator c. The coordinator, c, then computes the pair (a2, b2) = (a1 i∈Q a2 i , i∈Q b2 i ) where Q is a quorum of any t servers. In addition, PSAS also generates a translation certificate, T C, in a distributed manner with tracing of dishonest provers. T C is a non-interactive proof of the fact that (a1, b1) and (a2, b2) are encryptions of the same message, for decryption keys K pb and K sb respectively. This translation certificate provides robustness and verifiability, and is detailed in Appendix A.
After the transformation, PSAS signs and recomposes pac
, EncP K sb (s)) and sends it back to the broker. The broker forwards the package pac to the subscriber who can verify PSAS's signature on the package, decrypt it with his decryption key K sb to obtain document d, and then verify the publisher's signature on d.
• Accounting. At a frequency agreed upon with the publisher P B, PSAS provides P B with a log of all transformations of P B's events in the defined interval of time. Each log entry is signed by PSAS and includes the event package, the subscriber's public key, and the translation certificate. P B can then use this log to bill subscribers based on their usage. Furthermore, this provides a verifiable accounting method since the translation certification is publicly verifiable.
Security Analysis
The transformation scheme of [16] satisfies the following security properties: (1) correctness -any quorum Q of PSAS servers, sharing a publisher's decryption key, will be able to perform the transformation for a given subscriber's encryption key, (2) robustness -the protocol will allow the coordinator to determine whether any of the server's output is incorrect and substitute it with a valid output, (3) public verifiability -anyone will be able to verify that the correct transformation was performed using the translation certificate, and (4) privacy -the transformation process does not leak any information about the encrypted message to any set of PSAS servers smaller than a quorum (i.e., an adversary must compromise at least t of the n PSAS servers in order decrypt messages).
Based on these properties of the transformation process and on the well-known properties of digital signatures, we can show that our protocol provides confidentiality, integrity, and authentication against an adversary who has access to the network traffic in CBPS. Confidentiality is provided by keeping sensitive contents of event packages encrypted as they are routed from the publisher through the broker network and PSAS to the subscriber. The package transformation process maintains privacy of these contents. Integrity and authentication of events, subscriptions, registrations, and transformation requests are provided via digital signatures. Subscribers can verify signatures applied over the cleartext event contents and and pub/sub infrastructure components (e.g., PSAS) can verify signatures applied over the encrypted event contents. Therefore, the adversary will not be able to insert/modify events, subscriptions, registrations, and transformation requests.
We now briefly discuss our solution's advantage against adversaries that can comprise CBPS system entities as well (i.e., brokers, publishers, and subscribers). We assume that the adversary cannot simultaneously compromise a quorum of PSAS servers to obtain the decryption and signing keys (the proactive secret sharing scheme of [15] prevents the adversary from being able to obtain these keys by compromising t servers over time). The adversary will be able to control all functions of the compromised entity but the fact that all registrations, publications, and transformation requests go through the PSAS provides a means to monitor these actions and detect anomalous behavior. Anomalies can then be pursued to identify compromised entities.
An important security concern that we do not address here is Denial of Service (Dos) attacks. The ability of prevent insertion/modification of events is an important step in that direction but it may not be enough. This is because signature verification is computationally expensive and an adversary could potentially bring the system down by flooding it with signed events that all infrastructure components need to verify. Cheaper verification functions that provide DoS prevention, either combined with integrity and authentication or independently, need to be applied.
SCALABILITY
PSAS stores and manages publishers' decryption keys, verifies registration and transformation requests, performs transformations and signs them. In an Internet-scale CBPS system a single PSAS can therefore raise scalability concerns because of the computation and communication overhead of our protocol. To address this we informally show that our solution scales with deployment of additional PSASs as required. As illustrated in Figure 5 we then use the "asymmetric" nature of Jakobsson's proxy re-encryption scheme to establish transformation chains that allow an event to go through multiple PSASs. Our scalability solution only requires that each PSAS generate a decryption key shared among its servers and make the corresponding public encryption key available. No changes to the publisher and subscriber registration process are needed. In Figure 5 publisher P B publishes an event package pac' at broker B1. This package traverses t brokers before being delivered to subscriber SB. When the package reaches broker Bi, the broker knows that (1) the package will not be delivered to any subscriber registered with Bi and (2) the package needs to be forwarded to Bj who is registered with P SAS2. Bi then sends a transformation request to P SAS1 with P SAS2's public key, P Kps2, to obtain a transformed package pac . This package is forwarded to Bj and then routed through the broker network until it reaches Bt, who then obtains a transformation from P SAS2 before delivering the package to SB. This chain of two transformations can easily be extended to a longer one in settings where multiple P SASs are deployed for scalability. A formal scalability analysis needs to be undertaken.
RELATED WORK
There has been some recent focus on developing security solutions for CBPS systems. Opyrchal and Prakash [18] use caching techniques to minimize the number of symmetric encryption keys required to ensure confidentiality between brokers and subscribers. Miklos [17] proposes a Siena [9] based covering relation for access control that requires publishers/subscribers to present credentials in order to publish/subscribe to events. However, both these works assume that the adversary cannot access broker network communications. Feige et al. [13] , like us, do not assume trust in the pub/sub infrastructure. They develop a PKI-based methodology for building trust in the infrastructure as it is established and an access control mechanism for publishing and subscribing to events. However, they assume that once the broker network has been established, the adversary cannot access events as they traverse the network. We further relax this assumption and allow the adversary access to broker network communications. A notable effort in type-based pub/sub system security is the work of Belokosztolszki et al. [6] who use role-based access control to provide access control for publishing and subscribing to events, and to manage trust in the broker network.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a solution for ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of events as they are routed through an untrusted broker network. In addition, we provide usage-based accounting services. In the future we will formally categorize events for which confidentiality can be provided using our solution, undertake a detailed scalability analysis that takes into account all computation and communication costs, and implement and integrate our solution with a CBPS system.
